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NOTE
In re Grant: Where Does Washington Stand on
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration?
The Washington Supreme Court in In re Grant' sought to
determine whether life sustaining treatment2 could be legally
withheld from a terminally ill, non-comatose, incompetent
individual. In its December 1987 slip opinion, a majority of the
court expanded on its previous decisions empowering third
parties, including guardians, families, and physicians, to with-
hold and withdraw life sustaining treatment from incompetent
individuals.3 This was accomplished by characterizing artificial
1. 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987).
2. "Life sustaining treatment" has been defined as "[dirugs, medical devices or
procedures that can keep individuals alive who would otherwise die within a
foreseeable, though usually uncertain time period." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ELDERLY 4
(1987) [hereinafter LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES]. While use of life sustaining
treatment is often characterized as needlessly prolonging the dying process, this same
treatment is "capable of saving and sustaining life and, sometimes, capable of restoring
health and independence." Id. at 3.
The most common life sustaining treatments are:
(1) Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) - the restoration of heartbeat and
the maintenance of blood flow and breathing following cardiac or respiratory
arrest. Procedures range from manual, external cardiac massage and mouth-
to-mouth ventilation to electronic defibrillators, temporary pacemakers, and
mechanical ventilation.
(2) Mechanical ventilation - the use of a machine, most commonly a
respirator, to induce inhalation and dehalation of the lungs. Mechanical
ventilation is used to sustain patients whose own spontaneous breathing is
insufficient to sustain life.
(3) Renal (kidney) dialysis - the artificial method of maintaining the
chemical balance of the blood when a patient's kidneys have failed.
(4) Artificial nutrition and hydration - the provision of nourishment and
fluids for those unable to take sufficient amounts of food and fluids
themselves or for those unable to digest and absorb them adequately.
(5) Antibiotics - drug treatment to counter life threatening bacterial, viral,
or fungal infections.
Id. at 4.
3. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d
827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
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nutrition and hydration4 as removable, life sustaining medical
treatment. The court also gave third parties the power to
remove artificial nutrition and hydration before the incompe-
tent individual in question slips into a coma or persistent vege-
tative state.5 After numerous, bizarre procedural twists,
however, any semblance of a majority opinion disappeared, and
the resulting decision serves only to further complicate an
already complex and controversial issue.6
This Note will first show that through the Grant decision,
the Washington Supreme Court clearly demonstrated the judi-
ciary's institutional incompetence in resolving this complex,
social and ethical issue. Though the judiciary legitimately and
necessarily determines the rights of incompetent individuals, it
is poorly designed to legislate specific medical procedures and
ethics. Second, an examination of the history of life sustaining
treatment in Washington indicates that the majority's original
4. See supra note 2, at (4). Artificial nutrition and hydration is accomplished by
either of two methods:
(1) Enteral (tube) feeding - nutrients and water are infused into the
patient's throat, stomach, or abdomen. Two of the most common types are
naso-gastric (NG) tubes, which enter through the nose, run down the throat,
and into the stomach, and gastonomy (G) tubes, which are placed through the
abdomen and into the stomach. (2) Parenteral feeding - any method other
than enteral feeding. One common type is intravenous (IV) treatment, in
which nutrients and water are infused into a small, peripheral vein, usually in
the patient's arm. Another is total parenteral nutrition (TPN), also called
hyperalimentation, which is an IV technique where highly concentrated fluids
are placed in large, central veins. Parenteral feeding cannot be sustained for
long periods of time because it causes damage to the vein.
LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 2, at 275; see also id. at 280-86.
5. "Permanent loss of consciousness" has been used to describe individuals in
either a deep coma or a persistent vegetative state (PVS). PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT 174 n.9
(1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT].
A "deep coma" is characterized by deep unconsciousness, complete
unresponsiveness, and closed eyes. Id. Most patients die within a few weeks of
slipping into a deep coma. Id. at 180-81.
A "vegetative state" is characterized by unconsciousness, persistent brain stem
functions that maintain vital body functions, and often, weakness. Id. at 174 n.9. Some
of these patients "stay alive for an indefinite period and die of some other illness, often
contracted while they are unconscious." Id. at 178. Thus, PVS and terminal illness are
not synonymous, as some commentators have maintained. See Comment, Artificial
Nutrition and the Terminally Ill: How Should Washington Decide?, 61 WASH. L. REV.
419, 419 n.2 (1986) [hereinafter How Should Washington Decide].
6. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a Missouri Supreme
Court case which denied a request to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from
an incompetent individual. Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct.
3240 (1989). Oral arguments in the case were scheduled for the October 1989 term.
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opinion was yet another attempt to legitimize illogical and
unconstitutional reasoning granting third parties the power to
exercise the fundamental rights of incompetent individuals.
Finally, and most importantly, this Note will establish that the
majority's original opinion wrongly characterized artificial
nutrition and hydration as withholdable or withdrawable life
sustaining treatment.
I. IN RE GRANT
A. The Facts of the Case
Barbara Grant is afflicted with Batten's disease, a genetic,
late-juvenile, degenerative disease which affects the central
nervous system.7 Barbara was a normal child of above average
intelligence until, at the age of five, she began to experience
problems with her vision.' These problems were followed by
epileptic seizures, uncontrollable staggering, and speech diffi-
culties. In addition, Barbara has suffered severe mental retar-
dation.9 In 1978, at the age of fourteen, a court declared
Barbara incompetent and appointed her mother guardian.
Unable to care for her at home, the Grant family committed
Barbara to the Rainier School, a state institution in Buckley,
Washington.' °
In September 1985, Barbara's pulse rate dropped and her
breathing became irregular. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation
and oxygen were administered, and she was transported to
Harborview Medical Center in Seattle. The extent of treat-
ment she received at Harborview is unclear." Barbara
returned to the school that same day. When the Washington
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in her case in November
1986, Barbara could no longer walk or talk, she had difficulty
swallowing, and she was completely blind. Brain control over
7. The clinical name of the illness is Batten-Mayou disease, a "late juvenile type of
cerebral sphingolipidosis." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 404 (5th ed. 1982).
Sphingolipidosis is defined as "cerebral lipidosis; . . . any one of a group of inherited
diseases characterized by failure to thrive, hypertonicity, progressive spastic paralysis,
loss of vision and occurrence of blindness, usually with macular degeneration and optic
atrophy, convulsions, and mental. deterioration." Id. at 1314.
8. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 548, 747 P.2d 445, 447 (1987).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Verbatim Trial Transcript at 20, In re Grant (No. 89268) (1985) [hereinafter
Trial Transcript]. It appears that Barbara received only standard, stabilizing
treatment, such as the CPR and oxygen that she received at the Rainier School.
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her heart and lungs had also deteriorated.12
The Washington Supreme Court quoted physicians from
both the Rainier School and Harborview describing Barbara as"nearly comatose" and "in an almost vegetative state."'" The
court termed her death in the near future "inevitable.' ' 4
These findings, however, conflicted substantially with
those of the Pierce County Superior Court. 5 The trial judge
found Barbara to have "lived longer than what has been medi-
cally anticipated for her" and that "[n]o one can say how long
Barbara Grant will live or when she will die."' 6 Further, "Ms.
Grant is not in pain, appears to be at peace, and is able to
respond to outside stimuli, such as voices, sound and the pres-
ence of other people, at times."' 7
Based on subsequent developments, the trial judge's find-
ings seem the most accurate. Barbara remains alive today, free
from any extraordinary medical treatment."8 Further, because
of the indecipherable conclusion to which Barbara's case
came, 9 Judith Grant has once again petitioned the Pierce
County Superior court for an order to withhold treatment
from her daughter.2 °
B. The Court's Slip Opinion
Soon after Barbara's trip to Harborview in September
1985, Judith Grant sought an Ex Parte Order authorizing her
to withhold, in the event it became necessary, extraordinary2'
12. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 548, 747 P.2d at 446.
13. Id. at 550, 747 P.2d at 447 (emphasis added).
14. Id.
15. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, In re Grant (No. 89268)
(1986) [hereinafter Findings of Fact].
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Petition for Order Authorizing Guardian to Withhold Extraordinary Medical
Treatment, In re Grant (No. 89268) (1988) [hereinafter Petition].
19. See infra text accompanying notes 57-62.
20. See Petition, supra note 18, at 1.
21. "'Extraordinary' treatment has an unfortunate array of alternative meanings."
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 5, at 83. One
understanding of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatment is the
difference between common and unusual care; another is the difference between
simple and complex care. Both of these relative interpretations, however, mean
different things to individuals in different situations; what is common and simple for a
heart patient may be unusual and complex for a healthy individual.
Perhaps the most useful understanding of "extraordinary" is the difference
between useful and burdensome, or proportionate and disproportionate care. This
understanding is also open to different interpretations, but it has the advantage of
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life sustaining treatment from her daughter. The issue Judith
Grant first posed to the courts four years ago remains
unresolved today.
On October 2, 1985, a wary Pierce County Commissioner
appointed both a guardian ad litem and an "attorney for Bar-
bara Grant," telling the attorney to resist Judith Grant's peti-
tion.22 Barbara's immediate family and her guardian ad litem
agreed with her mother's request; only the attorney assigned
for Barbara opposed her motion.23
The trial began on October 24, 1985, and three months
later the judge denied Judith Grant's motion.24 Judith Grant
appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court. On Octo-
ber 7, 1986, the court decided to hear the case, and because of
the alleged "urgency of Barbara Grant's situation, '25 deter-
mined that it would hear the case before the end of the year.26
The court heard oral arguments on November 19, 1986, and
issued an Order with Opinion to Follow that same day. The
Order provided:
The guardian, Judith Grant, natural mother of Barbara
Grant, is authorized to approve and direct the withholding of
life sustaining procedures utilizing mechanical or other arti-
ficial means including cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
defibrilation, the use of a respirator, intubation, the insertion
of a naso-gastric tube, and intravenous nutrition and
"moral significance." Id. at 88. The common/unusual and simple/complex analyses
provide no indication of the effect of the treatment on a specific individual.
Proportionality analysis, on the other hand, allows a patient to weigh the burdens and
benefits of the treatment and make a personal decision whether to accept or forego the
treatment. Id. at 84-89; see also Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
Declaration on Euthanasia (1980), reprinted in DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING
TREATMENT, supra note 5, app. at 299 [hereinafter Declaration on Euthanasia].
This proportionality test espoused by the Vatican and the Presidential
Commission is not a test of social utility, weighing the impact of treatment on those
other than the patient. Rather, the burdens and benefits involved are those burdens
and benefits directly affecting the decision-making patient only. This is contrary to
the interpretation of Vatican doctrine referred to in Grant. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 563,
747 P.2d at 454 n.2; see generally Declaration on Euthanasia, supra.
The President's Commission calls for the abandonment of the ordinary/
extraordinary distinction and the adoption of a proportionality test in formulating life
sustaining treatment policy. See DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
supra note 5, at 89.
22. Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 10.
23. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 551, 747 P.2d at 448.
24. See Findings of Fact, supra note 15.
25. Motion for Accelerated Review at 2, In re Grant (No. 52609-5) (1986).
26. Decision to Retain Cause for Decision and Accept Accelerated Review, Grant
(No. 52609-5) (1986).
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hydration.2 7
The opinion that followed on December 10, 1987, over a
year after the November 1986 order, has been described as "a
piece of legislation. ' 2  Justice Callow's majority opinion
focused on four major issues. First, Justice Callow determined
that life sustaining treatment may be withdrawn from a non-
comatose, incompetent individual provided the individual "is in
an advanced stage of a terminal illness," and "is suffering
severe and permanent mental and physical deterioration."'
This was the first time the Washington Court allowed treat-
ment to be withdrawn from an incompetent individual who
was not in a coma or a persistent vegetative state.3 °
Second, the majority opinion stated that an order allowing
the withholding of all life sustaining treatment from a termi-
nally ill, incompetent individual may be issued before any such
treatment is needed.31 This had been the major issue at trial
3 2
and the judge had maintained that such an order was
"analagous to prior restraint. ' 33
Third, Justice Callow, in the first such decision in Wash-
ington, characterized artificial nutrition and hydration as life
sustaining treatment which may be legally withheld from non-
comatose, terminally ill, incompetent individuals.34
Finally, the opinion set out criteria35 by which the decision
to withhold will be made by the incompetent individual's
guardian and/or immediate family using a substituted judg-
ment standard3 6 or a best interests test.37 Justices Pearson,
27. Order with Opinion to Follow at 1, In re Grant (No. 52609-5) (1986).
28. Telephone interview with Hugh Robinson, attorney for Barbara Grant (Oct.
28, 1988).
29. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 556, 747 P.2d at 451.
30. No previous Washington court has allowed withdrawal of life sustaining
treatment before the patient slipped into a coma or persistent vegetative state. See
generally In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.
2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
31. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 557-59, 747 P.2d at 451-55.
32. Findings of Fact, supra note 15, at 3.
33. Id.
34. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 559-65, 747 P.2d at 452-55.
35. Id. at 566-67, 747 P.2d at 456.
36. Id. at 566, 747 P.2d at 456. Substituted judgment and best interests are two
types of vicarious or third party decision-making methods used by the Grant court and
others. See Gutheil and Appelbaum, Substituted Judgment: Best Interests in Disguise,
13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 8 (1983).
Under the best interests test, the guardian and/or family decides whether to
continue or forego treatment by determining which course of action would be in the
best interests of the incompetent individual. Under the substituted judgment
[Vol. 13:197
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Utter, Dolliver, and Durham joined in Justice Callow's
opinion.
In their concurring opinion, Justices Andersen and
Brachtenbach agreed with the majority that Barbara's family
could legally decide to remove her life support systems, but
vehemently dissented from the majority's characterization of
artificial nutrition and hydration as withholdable, life sus-
taining treatment.38 Justice Andersen called such a characteri-
zation "unadorned euthanasia"3 9 and scolded the majority for
making a decision that should have been made, if at all, by the
standard, however, the guardian and/or family base the decision to continue or forego
treatment by determining what the incompetent individual would decide if the
individual were competent. Id.
The best interests test has been attacked by law and psychiatry professors Gutheil
and Appelbaum for its inherent tendency to allow the personal biases of third parties
to determine what is best for the incompetent individual. Id. at 9. This tendency
makes it very possible that third parties will make decisions which reflect the third
party's personal views but which are in direct contradiction to the views of the
incompetent individual.
In response, some courts adopted the substituted judgment standard. See
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). By limiting third parties to a determination
of what the incompetent individual would decide, not what the third party would
decide for the incompetent individual, it was hoped that the impact of third party
personal biases would be minimized.
Some, however, doubt that the third party's decision can possibly "avoid being
contaminated by 'best interests' considerations, by his or her own feelings .. ,or by
unconscious influences arising from the decision itself or the guardian-ward
relationship." Gutheil and Appelbaum, supra, at 9.
Further, substituted judgment asks the impossible: "If the incompetent has never
before faced the situation at hand, or has never had the capacity to offer an opinion on
the subject, how does one assess what decision he would make?" Id. Even if the
incompetent individual, before becoming incompetent, directly addressed the
treatment in question, the fact that the individual now finds him or herself on the
threshold between life and death drastically changes the circumstances under which
the individual first addressed the treatment. The treatment now sustains his or her
life. This drastic change in circumstance casts serious doubt on the probative value of
any of the individual's previous statements or actions in determining the individual's
judgment. Id.; see also Bopp, Nutrition and Hydration for Patients: The
Constitutional Aspects, 4 ISSUES IN LAW AND MEDICINE 3 (1988). Simply put, any
method of third party decision making carries with it an extreme danger that an
incompetent individual's true wishes about remaining alive will not be carried out. See
In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 536, 531 N.E.2d 607, 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 896 (1988)
(Hancock, J., concurring) ("There simply is no way of excluding the possibility that
the patient has had a change of mind so that her past statements do not indicate her
present wishes.").
37. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 567, 747 P.2d at 456; see also supra note 36.
38. Id. at 570-74, 747 P.2d at 458-60 (Andersen, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
39. Id. at 570, 747 P.2d at 458 (Andersen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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citizens through their legislators.4 °
In contrast, Justices Goodloe and Dore dissented com-
pletely from Justice Callow's opinion, stating that Washington
law4 ' allows only competent adults, not their guardians, to
determine whether and when to withhold life sustaining treat-
ment.4 2 Justice Goodloe also accused the majority of preempt-
ing ongoing legislative debate on the issue of artificial nutrition
and hydration.4 3 Like Justice Andersen, Justice Goodloe
observed that the legislature, not the court, is the appropriate
forum for such critical social value judgments.4
Even after the court issued its order and opinion, it was far
from finished with the case of Barbara Grant. On December
22, 1987, the court received a letter from Assistant Washington
Attorney General Steve Milam,45 which brought to the court's
attention new legislation changing the Washington Informed
Consent Law.46 According to Milam's letter, the court's
requirement that all family members agree with the decision
to withdraw treatment was in error. The new legislation pri-
oritized classes of persons, from guardians and those with
durable power of attorney, to family members, who could pro-
40. Id.
41. The Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010-.905 (1987) [hereinafter
NDA]. The NDA allows competent adults to refuse life sustaining treatment, before
facing such treatment, through a written directive, or "living will." See infra notes 67-
80 and accompanying text.
42. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 578, 747 P.2d at 462 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 578-79, 747 P.2d at 463 (Goodloe, J., dissenting). See infra notes 61-80
and accompanying text and notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
44. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 579, 747 P.2d at 463 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
45. Letter to the Washington Supreme Court from Assistant Attorney General
Steve Milam, In re Grant (No. 52609-5) (Dec. 22, 1987) [hereinafter Letter].
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065 (1987):
(1) Informed consent for health care for a patient who is not competent, as
defined in [WASH. REV. CODE] § 11.88.010 (1)(b), to consent may be obtained
from a person authorized to consent on behalf of such patient. Persons
authorized to provide informed consent shall be a member of one of the
following classes of persons in the following order of priority:
(a) The appointed guardian of the patient, if any;
(b) The individual, if any, to whom the patient has given a durable power
of attorney that encompasses the authority to make health care decisions;
(c) The patient's spouse;
(d) Children of the patient who are at least eighteen years of age;
(e) Parents of the patient; and
(f) Adult brothers and sisters of the patient.
(2) if the physician seeking informed consent for proposed health care of the
patient who is not competent to consent makes reasonable efforts to locate
and secure authorization from a competent person in the first or succeeding
class and finds no such person available, authorization may be given by any
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vide informed consent for incompetent individuals.47
The letter also asked the court "to consider errata changes
to the opinion which I [Milam] believe would not have any sub-stantive impact on the decision itself" but would eliminate
confusion between the opinion and the new law.48 An opinionrevised with Milam's five proposed "changes," however, would
not require the unanimous decision of an incompetent individ-
ual's immediate family to withhold life support. On the con-trary, the changes would allow certain individuals, as they fell
within the priority scheme provided in the statute, to decidewhen incompetent individuals would receive life sustaining
treatment, if at all.49 Milam asked that unanimity, which hasbeen seen as a necessary condition to protect the incompetent
individual's true interests, 0 be abandoned.
The court opened reconsideration of the case on theinformed consent issue on its own motion," and on January 5,1988, issued an order that changed its opinion precisely asMilam had suggested.52 One month later, however, the courtreversed itself completely, when it issued another Order which
stated that the January 5th Order had been "improvidently
person in the next class in the order of descending priority. However, noperson under this section may provide informed consent to health care:
(a) if a person of higher priority under this section has refused to give
such authorization; or
(b) if there are two or more individuals in the same class and the decision
is not unanimous among all available members of that class.
(3) Before any person authorized to provide informed consent on behalf of apatient not competent to consent exercises that authority, the person mustfirst determine in good faith that that patient, if competent, would consent tothe proposed health care. If such a determination cannot be made, thedecision to consent to the proposed health care is in the patient's best
interests.
47. Letter, supra note 45, at 1.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2-3. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065 (1987), supra note 46. The natureand timing of an incompetent individual's death could be determined by a single
individual.
50. See In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 567, 747 P.2d at 456 (the court requiredunanimous approval of the patient's guardian, family members, physician, and health
care facility before treatment could be withdrawn).
51. No record exists of either party moving for reconsideration on the informedconsent issue. Normally, a decision will be mandated by the Clerk of the SupremeCourt if no motion for reconsideration is filed within twenty days after the decision orif the parties stipulate that no such motion will be filed. See WASH. R. APP. P. 12 .5(c),
12.4(b).
52. Order Changing Opinion, In re Grant (No. 52609-5) (Jan. 5, 1988); Letter,supra note 45, at 2-3 (court's changes are verbatim from Milam's letter).
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granted."53 The court rescinded the first order, retained juris-
diction for consideration of the application of the Informed
Consent Law on its own motion, and directed the parties to
submit supplemental briefs on the informed consent issue.M
For one month, then, the court changed its majority opinion
based solely on a letter received from an assistant attorney
general afiter the court had released its decision. Though the
court later realized the impact of these changes and corrected
itself, the fact that it wavered at the behest of another branch
of state government, after apparently reaching a decision on its
own, dramatically demonstrates the institutional incompetence
of the court to settle this difficult issue.
The court finally washed its hands of the Grant case in
July, 1988. On July 15, the court issued two orders: the first
denied its own motion for reconsideration,55 and the other
removed Justice Durham's name from Justice Callow's major-
ity opinion, instead appending it to Justice Andersen's concur-
ring and dissenting opinion.'
This final twist completely befuddled an already confused
issue. What had previously been a five-vote majority decision
with two dissenting camps of two justices each was trans-
formed into a 4-3-2 outcome with no clear determination of
exactly what decision had been made. The revised opinion,
like the original, lists a majority of justices that sanctions
Judith Grant's legal right to withhold life sustaining treatment
from her daughter. This majority includes Justices Callow,
Pearson, Utter, Dolliver, Anderson, Brachtenbach, and Dur-
ham. However, Justice Andersen and Justice Goodloe strongly
dissented from Justice Callow's inclusion of artificial nutrition
and hydration under the rubric of life sustaining treatment.
Thus, the decision also possesses a majority of justices requir-
ing at a minimum, that the legislature and not the court make
53. Order, In re Grant (No. 52609-5) (Feb. 16, 1988) [hereinafter Order]. Justice
Durham said that the court was concerned with the potential impact of the "ill
advised" first Order and revised opinion. Substantial conflicts of interest could arise,
the court felt, such as "a second wife making the decision for the children of a first
wife." Telephone interview with Justice Barbara Durham, Justice of the Supreme
Court of Washington (Oct. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Durham].
54. Order, supra note 53.
55. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, In re Grant (No. 52609-5) (July 15,
1988). See also supra note 51.
56. In re Grant, 757 P.2d 534 (1988) (Revision of the Listing of Concurring
Justices, July 15, 1988). This revision is incorporated into the bound edition of the
official reporter. See In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545 (1987).
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such an inclusion.5 1 Justices Andersen, Brachtenbach, Dur-
ham, Goodloe, and Dore are aligned under this proposition.
The opinion was finally mandated on July 19, 1988, yet the
confusion caused by Grant was just beginning. Attorneys rep-
resenting health care providers across the state have struggled
to determine the true meaning of Grant.5 Some have claimed
that the 1986 Order 9 authorizing the withholding of artificial
nutrition and hydration has precedential value.' Thus, artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration can be withheld in the same way
as, for example, kidney dialysis. Others, however, in light of
the Andersen and Goodloe opinions, see the case as a clear
finding that removal of artificial nutrition and hydration is
euthanasia and therefore illegal.6'
Justice Durham has called Grant "very muddy."62  As for
the artificial nutrition and hydration controversy, she states, "I
don't think we came to a decision on that issue. '63
The bizarre procedural twists of Grant may also have had
an impact on other adjudicated cases. 4 For example, a Califor-
nia court used Grant to show that no final decision in the
country has found that artificial nutrition and hydration are
not withholdable, life sustaining treatment.65 More dramati-
cally, a Washington man was recently convicted of first degree
murder for shooting a young girl who died after doctors with-
drew life sustaining equipment, including artificial nutrition
and hydration.66 If the mandated version of Grant states that
artificial nutrition and hydration cannot be withheld without
57. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 43.
58. Interview with Steven P. Helgeson, Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court,
Olympia, Washington (Oct. 10, 1988) [hereinafter Helgeson].
59. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
60. Helgeson, supra note 58.
61. Id. Both parties in the Cruzan case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court,
supra note 6, interpret the mandated version of Grant in this way. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari to the Missouri Supreme Court at 15-16, Cruzan v. Director of
Missouri Dep't. of Health (No. 88-1503) (1989); Brief in Opposition at 15-16, Cruzan v.
Director of Missouri Dep't. of Health (No. 88-1503) (1989).
62. Durham, supra note 53.
63. Id.
64. Grant was cited in a case which has since been vacated. The purpose for
vacation is unknown. See In re Estate of Prange, 116 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 520 N.E.2d 946
(1988).
65. In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 189, 189 n.1, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 841 n.l., cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988).
66. State v. Yates (Kitsap Co. Superior Ct. No. 87-1-00444-7) (1988). Extensive pre-
trial litigation concerned the issue of whether the girl's nutrition and hydration could
be lawfully withdrawn.
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legislative approval, the decisions relying on the slip opinion
are severely weakened.
II. THE HISTORY OF LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT IN
WASHINGTON
A. The Natural Death Act
Washington is one of forty-one states with "living will"
legislation. 7 The Natural Death Act (NDA) was enacted in
1979 and permits a competent adult to formulate a directive
outlining his or her desire to have life sustaining procedures
withheld or withdrawn in the event of a terminal, "incurable
injury, disease, or illness."6 " Life sustaining procedures are
defined as any artificial or mechanical procedure which
replaces a vital bodily function of a terminally ill person and
serves only to prolong an imminent death.6 9
The NDA is meant to give a competent adult the means to
exercise the right to refuse medical treatment before he or she
becomes physically unable to convey that refusal. The legisla-
ture, however, recognized the "considerable uncertainty" that
exists when the legal and medical professions attempt to deter-
mine the nature and timing of the death of a patient who can-
not directly express his or her views.. As a result, the NDA is
a cautious statute that strictly limits the circumstances under
which life sustaining treatment may be legally withheld or
withdrawn from an incommunicative patient.7 '
This caution is evident throughout the statute. It contains
witnessing requirements that are more restrictive than those
for executing a conventional will.72 A "living will" is also more
67. Kamen, Wien Exactly Does Life End?, The Washington Post, National
Weekly Edition, Sept. 18-24, 1989, at 31.
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.030(1) (1987).
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.020(4),(6),(7) (1987).
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010 (1987).
71. The NDA also declares that neither euthanasia nor "any affirmative or
deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying
is permitted." WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.100 (1987).
72. Cf., WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.010, .020 (1987) (witnesses to wills can also be
beneficiaries of the will). See Chambers Estate, 187 Wash. 417, 60 P.2d 41 (1936)
(witnesses of a "living will," however, cannot be related to the declarant by blood or
marriage, cannot be the declarant's attending physician or an employee of the health
care facility in which the declarant is a patient, and cannot be entitled to any portion
of the declarant's estate upon the declarant's death. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.030(1)).




easily revoked than a conventional will. 3 Further, the direc-
tive is not absolute. State interests, such as the protection of"potential human life," make the directive void; it is therefore
not effective if the declarant is pregnant.74
The NDA also deals with the issue of how declarants who
become incompetent should be treated. The directive remains
in effect for the duration of the declarant's incompetency or
until the declarant is able to communicate with the attending
physician.75 Moreover, if the attending physician refuses to
effectuate the directive, he or she must make a good faith
effort to refer the declarant to a physician who will.76
Clearly, the NDA attempts to insure that the declarant's
actual decision regarding withholding or withdrawing life sus-
taining procedures will be fulfilled. Because of the gravity of
this decision, only a competent declarant, and not a guardian
or physician substituting his or her judgment 77 for that of the
declarant or acting in the declarant's best interests,78 can make
or change the written directive. The NDA does not empower
third parties to make decisions about life sustaining treatment
for incompetent individuals. 79
.Despite the cautionary tone of the "living will" statutes,
the enforceability of these directives is unclear. In making
decisions about the nature and timing of an incommunicative
patient's death, doctors, lawyers, and judges face considerable
uncertainty. As one author observed, a directive "is not con-
clusive in any state. The attending physician who has potential
civil or criminal liability has a large say in the matter of when
73. Cf., WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.040 (1987) (a conventional will can be revoked
only by another written will or by destruction by the testator or someone in the
testator's presence acting under his or her direction, as proved by two witnesses. A
"living will," on the other hand, can be revoked by physical act (cancellation,
defacement, or destruction) of the declarant or someone in the declarant's presence
acting under his or her direction, by written revocation, or by verbal expression).
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.030(1)(c) (1987). Even the fundamental right to
refuse medical treatment can be superceded by a state interest in protecting what has
been termed "potential human life." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This position
was challenged in DeNino v. State ex rel. Gorton, 102 Wash. 2d 327, 684 P.2d 1297
(1984), but the case was dismissed for failure to present a justiciable controversy.
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.040(3) (1987).
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.060(2) (1987).
77. See supra note 36.
78. Id.
79. In fact, if a person either intentionally causes life sustaining procedures to be
withheld or withdrawn by falsifying a directive or by withholding personal knowledge
of a revocation, that person can be prosecuted for murder. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.122.090 (1987). See discussion at Section II. B. 1, infra.
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to pull the plug."'8
B. Judicial History in Washington: Colyer, Hamlin &
Ingram
The NDA did not specify that any action should be taken
to withhold or withdraw life sustaining treatment from incom-
petent individuals who, if they had ever been competent to do
so, had not formulated a directive. Prior to Grant, then, the
Washington Supreme Court was forced to address the issue of
withholding and withdrawing medical treatment from incom-
petent individuals on three occasions.8 " Familiarity with these
decisions is crucial to a clear understanding of Grant.
1. In re Colyer
In re Colyer,8 a 1983 case, involved a 69-year old woman
who sustained a heart attack and was resuscitated only after
oxygen deprivation had caused massive brain damage.8 3 She
existed in a "persistent vegetative state,"'  was unresponsive to
pain8 5 or verbal stimuli, unable to breathe without a respirator,
and, presumably, received artificial nutrition and hydration. 8
The attending physicians felt that the likelihood of any
improvement in brain function was extremely remote, and that
she would "persist" in an infantile state.8 7 Mrs. Colyer's hus-
80. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLs, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 285 (3d ed. 1984).
81. See cases cited supra note 3.
82. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
83. Id. at 116, 660 P.2d at 740.
84. See definition supra note 5.
85. A finding of "unresponsiveness" is, at best, hypothesis.
Physicians today assume that as the patient slips into a coma, no further
awareness is present. This assumption is impossible to prove or disprove at
this time. Because an organism in a coma does not usually respond to even
deep pain, we assume that organism is unlikely to perceive the more subtle
sensations of hunger or thirst. The patient who recovers from a coma
typically has no memory of the experience. Yet if future sophisticated studies
in neurology were to suggest the presence of awareness even in deep coma,
many treatment approaches, including nutritional support, would require
reassessment.
Dresser and Boisaubin, Ethics, Law, and Nutritional Support, 145 ARCHIVES OF INTER-
NAL MED. 122, 124 (1985).
86. No specific reference to artificial nutrition and hydration appears in the case,
but the court indicated that Mrs. Colyer was completely incapacitated. Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d at 116-17, 660 P.2d at 740. The case, however, addressed only withdrawal of
Mrs. Colyer's respirator.
87. Id. at 117, 660 P.2d at 740. Although such prognoses are usually borne out, it
must be recognized that they rest on statistics; most patients do not recover, but the
evidence shows that some in fact do. In 1962, Dr. Lev Landau, Nobel Prize winning
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band was appointed her guardian, and he sought and obtained
a court order authorizing him to withdraw his wife's life sup-
port systems. 8
The Washington Supreme Court in Colyer largely followed
previous cases from other jurisdictions in upholding the trial
court.89 It began by stating the well-founded theory that,
under the constitutional right to privacy' and the common
law right to freedom from bodily invasion,91 competent adults
physicist, was critically injured in a car accident. He suffered massive internal injuries,
fractures, and brain damage. Even while on a respirator, his breathing and circulation
failed numerous times. He suffered paralysis in his extremities, he was deaf, blind,
speechless, without reflexes, and his brain received insufficient amounts of oxygen for
over 100 days. Fourteen weeks after the accident and seven weeks after being
removed from life sustaining treatment, Landau began to recover and eventually
resumed his career in theoretical physics. "[T]he Landau case undermined the
argument-which was just then being advanced in the English medical journal,
Lancet-that doctors should not seek to prolong the lives of brain-damaged patients in
'irrevocable comas' ..... Landau had been in such a coma for months." Currie, The
Redefinition of Death, ORGANISM, MEDICINE, AND METAPHYSICS 184-85 (S. Spicker ed.
1978).
Numerous other cases of individuals defying "irreversible" comas and "brain
death" exist: a soldier who stepped on a land mine could not be resuscitated, he
registered a flat EEG, and was declared dead. An embalmer preparing to inject the
soldier's femoral artery with embalming fluid, however, detected a faint pulse. The
soldier was resuscitated successfully and recovered, sustaining only a speech
impediment and no other brain damage.
A woman sustained severe brain stem injury in a car accident, and X-rays revealed
that her brain was "a jumble." Doctors declared her "a vegetable" and suggested it
would be more humane to withdraw her nutrition and hydration. She was "brain
dead" for four months yet recovered to marry and raise a family. Slightly slurred
speech was the only evident, permanent damage. See Currie at 184-91 for these and
more cases; see also DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 5,
at 179 n.22 (citing the cases of two patients who recovered consciousness and cognitive
function after a year in a persistent vegetative state caused by lack of oxygen).
88. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 117, 660 P.2d at 740.
89. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
90. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Most subsequent
decisions are in accord. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 739-49, 370 N.E.2d at 424; Quinlan, 70
N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. But see Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 272-73 (court called this a "disputed question... which the Supreme Court
has repeatedly declined to consider").
The Colyer court found that the state's ability to impose criminal sanctions, its
regulation of physicians and hospitals, its involvement in the guardianship process, and
its parens patriae responsibility for incompetents constituted sufficient "state action"
to apply the right to privacy to the state through the fourteenth amendment. Colyer,
99 Wash. 2d at 121, 660 P.2d at 742.
91. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). Accord Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at
376, 420 N.E.2d at 70; 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 738-39, 370 N.E.2d at
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have the right to refuse medical treatment. The court also
found, like courts in other jurisdictions, that this right is sub-
ject to the state interest of protecting the sanctity of life and is
therefore not absolute.92 Quoting the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, the court determined that the state interest
finds its expression in four areas: (1) the preservation of life;
(2) the protection of interests of innocent third parties; (3) the
prevention of suicide, and; (4) the maintenance of the ethical
integrity of the medical profession.93
Colyer held that the first interest, the preservation of life,
prevails over a patient's right to refuse treatment when the
patient does not consent to life saving treatment.94 For cases
in which treatment only prolongs an incurable condition, how-
ever, the court adopted the balancing test from In re Quin-
lan.95 It weighed the degree of bodily invasion involved in the
treatment against the state's interest in preserving life.96
Clearly, under this analysis, only very slightly intrusive treat-
ment could be administered over a patient's objections. 97
The second interest, the protection of innocent third par-
ties, prevails only when the patient has dependents who will
not be provided for after the patient's death.98 Since Mrs. Col-
424. The Colyer court observed that this right forms the basis of the informed consent
doctrine. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 121-22, 660 P.2d at 743.
92. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 122, 660 P.2d at 743. See Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 377, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 273, 420 N.E.2d at 71; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 740-41, 370 N.E.2d at 424-25;
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
93. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 122, 660 P.2d at 743 (citing Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741,
370 N.E.2d at 425).
94. See In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1984). The court granted an order
authorizing a hospital to administer a blood transfusion over the religious objections of
a competent, adult patient.
95. 70 N.J. 10, 40-41, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). This
Quinlan balancing test is different from the proportionality analysis described above.
See supra note 21. The Quinlan court instituted its test for the benefit of third party
decision making; the Presidential Commission's report and the Vatican's declaration,
on the other hand, foresaw individuals facing their own death using the
proportionality analysis to weigh their personal burdens and benefits to arrive at their
own decision.
96. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 122-23, 660 P.2d at 743.
97. In the cases where the patient's decision was overridden by the state's interest,
"the medical procedure required (usually a transfusion) constituted a minimal bodily
invasion and the chances of recovery and return to functioning life were very good."
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
98. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743. See also In re Osborne, 294 A.2d
372 (D.C. 1972) (father allowed to refuse blood transfusion because his family promised
to care for his children); In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
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yer's husband and immediate family all requested withdrawal
of treatment, there were no third party interests involved in
this case.
The court found that the third interest, the prevention of
suicide, did not apply to cases of terminally ill patients seeking
to withdraw treatment that only prolonged their lives.99 Again
following the lead of previous decisions from other jurisdic-
tions, the court found that "a death which occurs after the
removal of life sustaining systems is from natural causes,
neither set in motion nor intended by the patient."'100
Finally, the court found that the state's interest in preserv-
ing the ethical integrity of the medical profession does not out-
weigh a terminally ill patient's right to refuse treatment that
merely prolongs life.10' In fact, the court reasoned, recognizing
the patient's right to refuse artificial support is part of a doc-
tor's general duty of care and comfort. 10 2
While the court recognized that a patient's right to refuse
life sustaining treatment may be outweighed by a state inter-
est, it appears that the patient's right would rarely be disal-
lowed by the limited state interest outlined in Colyer.10 3 The
court broke no new ground with its examination of a patient's
right to refuse medical treatment; the right to be free from
bodily invasion and the right to privacy have long been the
foundation of the informed consent doctrine.10 4  However,
when the court determined that third parties have the power
to withdraw life sustaining treatment from incompetent indi-
viduals who have not specifically expressed their views on the
subject, it adopted new and perplexing reasoning.
In re Quinlan o' first gave third parties the power to with-
F.2d 1000 (denial of patient's refusal of blood transfusion based at least partially on the
fact that she was the mother of a seven-month old infant).
99. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743.
100. Id. (citing Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743
n.11, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977)). See also Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665.
101. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743 (quoting Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at
743-44, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27). See also Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 48-50, 355 A.2d at 668-69; In
re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981).
102. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743-44.
103. See Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (state interests were even more limited; medical procedures
would be administered against patient's will only if patient posed a health threat to the
community or if he or she engaged in activities inherently dangerous to his or her life).
104. See case cited supra note 91.
105. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
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draw life sustaining treatment in 1976,106 and several courts
have followed suit.1" 7 Like the Quinlan court, the Colyer court
made the unfounded determination that, because the incompe-
tent patient could not exercise her personal right to refuse life
sustaining treatment, her personal right was not necessarily
unexercisable. 108 In Quinlan, Karen Quinlan's father made the
decision to withdraw life sustaining treatment, while in Colyer,
Bertha Colyer's husband exercised his wife's personal right.
The Colyer court based its determination on the reasoning
of the New Jersey Supreme Court that an incompetent individ-
ual's guardian and family must exercise the individual's right
to refuse treatment or the right will be lost.10 9 The New
Jersey court's opinion is conspicuously void of any authority
from common, statutory, constitutional, federal, or state law to
support its determination that third parties, under the guise of
exercising an incompetent individual's "personal" right, may
determine the nature and timing of that incompetent individ-
ual's death. In addition, the court failed to even consider that
this third party decision making might itself be the means of
destroying an individual's personal right to privacy and self
determination. As law professor Yale Kamisar writes:
Was [Quinlan] really a 'right to die' case? No. It is far more
accurate-albeit more troublesome-to view it as a 'power to
let someone else die' case. Why? Because letting people die
when you have a special relationship with them and a duty
to care for them is the equivalent of killing them. 110
106. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
107. See Gray by Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Barber v. Superior
Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp. Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417 (1977).
108. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 124, 660 P.2d at 744.
109. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. The court specifically stated:
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative
existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of
her right of privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded
solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the
choice. The only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit
the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment, subject to
the qualifications hereinafter stated, as to whether she would exercise it in
these circumstances.
110. Kamisar, The Real Quinlan Issue, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1985, § 1, at 19, col. 1.
See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 720-21 (3d ed. 1986):
It may be that society will recognize some ability of family members or
doctors to engage in 'passive euthanasia' based on a societal decision that the
quality of an individual's life is such that it should not be continued under
[Vol. 13:197
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Kamisar cuts to the heart of the courts' flawed reasoning:
the third party decisions authorized by the Quinlan and Colyer
courts and their progeny accomplish results which conflict
with those the courts claim they accomplish. These decisions
do not protect the rights of incompetent individuals; instead,
they broaden the power third parties have over these helpless
individuals.
The Colyer court also adopted New Jersey's decision mak-
ing procedure. The incompetent individual's guardian, with or
without regard to the previous statements of the individual,"'
is "to use his best judgment and exercise, when appropriate, an
incompetent's personal right to refuse life sustaining treat-
ment."1 '2 It is of no consequence to the guardian's substituted
judgment 1 3 that the incompetent individual never "explicitly
expressed her desire to refuse life sustaining treatment.""' 4
Further, the Colyer court required that the guardian's judg-
ment be upheld because it presumed that the vast majority of
similarly situated individuals would choose to refuse such
treatment as well."' As Kamisar points out, however,
[e]ven if only a very few patients ... were determined to
certain circumstances. Nevertheless, failure to recognize this decision as one
of allowing persons to take the life of another will lead to poorly reasoned
decisions.
See also Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed 'Mercy Killing'Legisla-
tion, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-11
(2d ed. 1988); Note, The Refusal of Life Sustaining Medical Treatment vs. the State's
Interest in the Preservation of Life: A C7arification of the Interests at Stake, 58 WASH.
U.L.Q. 85.
111. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 131-32, 660 P.2d at 748; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d
at 664.
112. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 128, 660 P.2d at 746.
113. See supra note 36.
114. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 132, 660 P.2d at 748.
115. Id. at 134, 660 P.2d at 749. The court stated that "[i]f the patient's condition is
hopeless or there is 'no reasonable possibility of returning to a cognitive, sapient state,'
the patient's right of privacy outweighs the State's interest in preserving life." Id.
(citations omitted). This statement represents a massive leap in logic wherein "the
right to privacy" is equated with termination of a "hopeless" life; if there is no
reasonable hope of recovery, the court seemed to say, everyone would exercise his or
her right to privacy by terminating the use of life sustaining treatment. It appears that
this equation is based on the following, equally illogical premise found in Quinlan:
"The decision to terminate life sustaining treatment should be accepted by a society,
the overwhelming majority of whose members, we think, in similar circumstances,
exercise such a choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to them."
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. The court reasoned that most people would
not wish to live what the court had deemed a hopeless life. Accordingly, a decision by
a guardian to terminate such a life, despite the fact that the incompetent individual
might have disagreed, must be upheld.
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struggle on, their being in a distinct minority is no justifica-
tion for denying them their personal right to do so. After
all, a court, even society's silent majority, cannot speak for
all comatose people .... 116
Finally, the Colyer court completed its adoption of New
Jersey law by finding that the decision to withdraw life sus-
taining treatment was the sole province of an incompetent
individual's guardian, family, and physician, free from judicial
intervention. 117 The court reasoned that "the judicial process
[is] an unresponsive and cumbersome mechanism for decisions
of this nature. ' 118  Contrary to decisions in other jurisdic-
tions," 9 the court found that the rights of incompetent individ-
uals are sufficiently protected by the existing state system of
guardians' 20 and guardians ad litem, supplemented by attend-
116. Kamisar, The Real Quinlan Issue, supra note 110.
117. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 127-28, 660 P.2d at 746; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d
at 669.
118. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 127, 660 P.2d at 746; see Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d
at 669.
119. See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370
N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977). The court held:
[this] most difficult and awesome question-whether potentially life-
prolonging treatment should be withheld from a person incapable of making
his own decision [is not, as the Quinlan court found,] . . . 'a gratuitous
encroachment' on the domain of medical expertise. Rather, such questions of
life and death seem to us to require the process of detached but passionate
investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of
government was created. Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and that of
the lower court, and is not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to
represent the 'morality and conscience of our society,' no matter how highly
motivated or impressively constituted.
120. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 129, 660 P.2d at 746-47. The Colyer court cited
Washington's guardianship statute, which provides that an appointed guardian has the
power "to care for and maintain the incompetent or disabled person, assert his or her
rights and best interests, and to provide timely, informed consent to necessary medical
procedures." WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.040 (1987). The court also observed that the
statute contains exceptions to what the guardian can consent to without a court order:
(a) Therapy or other procedure which induces convulsion;
(b) Surgery solely for the purpose of psychosurgery;
(c) Amputation;
(d) Other psychiatric or mental health procedures which are intrusive on the
person's bodily integrity, physical freedom of movement, or the rights set
forth in [WASH. REV. CODE] § 71.05.370.
Id. The court found that its newly recognized doctrine of guardian power to withdraw
life sustaining treatment did not fit into these necessarily "narrowly construed" excep-
tions. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 129, 660 P.2d at 747. It is difficult to fathom, however,
how a guardian cannot provide consent for an amputation to be performed on his or
her ward without court approval, yet can determine the nature and timing of the
ward's death without such approval. The Massachusetts court in Saikewicz, unlike the
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ing physicians and a "prognosis board" of other physicians.12 1
Only in the event of disagreement among these parties may
the courts intervene.122
2. In re Hamlin
The Washington Supreme Court addressed the specific
issue of withdrawing life sustaining treatment a year and a half
later in the 1984 case of In re Hamlin.23 Joseph Hamlin was a
42-year old man, severely retarded from birth, who suffered a
heart attack and lapsed into a vegetative state. 24 Because of
his lifelong condition, Joseph Hamlin had never expressed his
views on the provision or withdrawal of life sustaining
procedures. 25
The court followed the reasoning it employed in Colyer in
all but two respects. First, it greatly broadened the power of a
family to withhold or withdraw life sustaining treatment from
one of its members by finding that, when a family exists, a
guardian need not be appointed. 26 Second, the court limited
its own dictum in Colyer which stated that the judiciary may
be required to intervene in the substantive decision to with-
hold or withdraw treatment from incompetent individuals who
have never let their wishes be known. 27 The court held that
even in these cases, if the individual's guardian, physician, and
prognosis committee agree upon the individual's best inter-
ests,128 the judiciary need not become involved.129
3. In re Ingram
The final Washington case prior to Grant addressing the
Colyer court, was at least able to grasp the magnitude of the interest involved in these
cases. See supra text accompanying note 119.
121. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 134-37, 660 P.2d at 749-50.
122. Id. at 136, 660 P.2d at 750. For the court's complete presentation of its system
of guardians, guardians at litem, and physicians, see id. at 128-37, 660 P.2d at 746-51.
123. 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
124. Id. at 812-13, 689 P.2d at 1374.
125. Id. at 812, 689 P.2d at 1374.
126. Id. at 818, 689 P.2d at 1377. Two of the limited "safeguards" the court
provided an incompetent individual in Colyer, the guardianship hearing and the
additional voice of the guardian, disappeared because the court found the safeguards
too "cumbersome." See id. at 824-26, 689 P.2d at 1380-81 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 819-21, 689 P.2d at 1378; see also Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 136, 660 P.2d at
750 (1983).
128. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 820, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1984); see also supra
note 36.
129. Id.; but see supra note 119.
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medical treatment of incompetent individuals was a companion
case to Hamlin, In re Ingram. 30 Opal Ingram, a sixty-six-year-
old woman, had malignant cancer of the larynx. Though adju-
dicated incompetent, she expressed her preference for radia-
tion treatment rather than removal of her vocal cords.
Removal offered a higher success rate than radiation, but
necessitated the loss of speech. Ingram's guardian petitioned
the court to authorize the surgery.
The court recognized that this case shared with Colyer and
Hamlin the common issues of an individual's right to refuse
medical treatment and the authority of the guardian under the
Washington guardianship statute.' The court, however,
found few other similarities to those two prior cases. The
court characterized Ingram as a case of choice not between life
and death but between two different treatments.132 Surgery
provided a better chance of a cure while radiation offered less
severe side effects. 33
The court also construed the exceptions to the rule that
guardians obtain court approval before consenting to medical
procedures more broadly than it had in Colyer.'M The Colyer
court found that a guardian need not seek judicial approval to
withhold or withdraw life sustaining treatment. 35 In Ingram,
on the other hand, the court searched for the guardianship
statute's intent. The court declared that a guardian must gain
court approval before consenting to any "highly intrusive, irre-
versible medical treatment."'3 It is ironic that a guardian may
determine the nature and timing of a ward's death with no
judicial supervision, yet he or she cannot consent to surgery for
the ward without obtaining judicial approval.
The Washington Supreme Court, beginning with Colyer,
has allowed guardians, families, and/or physicians to terminate
130. 102 Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984).
131. Id. at 836, 689 P.2d 1368; Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 119-22, 128-32, 660 P.2d at 741-
43, 746-48; see also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
132. Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 843, 689 P.2d at 1371-72.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 836-38, 689 P.2d at 1368-69.
135. "These exceptions do not seem applicable to the situation we are addressing
here." Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 129, 660 P.2d at 747 (construing statute identical to
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.040(3)(a)-(d)); see also supra notes 117-22 and accompanying
text.
136. Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 837, 689 P.2d at 1369. Under this definition,
treatment to which a guardian could previously consent without petitioning the
judiciary became subject to judicial approval. Virtually any surgery comes under the
umbrella of "highly intrusive" and "irreversible treatment."
[Vol. 13:197
In Re Grant
life sustaining treatment for incompetent individuals by use of
the substituted judgment test or a best interests standard with-
out requiring court approval. The Grant case used Colyer and
Hamlin as a foundation, broadening this power of guardians
and consequently reducing protection for incompetent individ-
uals. In Grant, the court further weakened the rights of
incompetent persons in two, distinct ways: first, it allowed
guardians to withhold or withdraw life sustaining treatment
from non-comatose, incompetent individuals;13 and second, it
classified artificial nutrition and hydration as withholdable and
withdrawable life sustaining treatment. In doing so, the court
usurped the general authority of the legislature to formulate
law, especially in complex areas requiring exhaustive fact-find-
ing, and effectively preempted ongoing legislative debate.
C. The Current Legislative Debate
A common thread running through most decisions relating
to the withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment is
the appeal by many judges for the legislature to resolve the
issue. 13 Yet, the courts are not uncomfortable with broaching
the issue of incompetent individuals' rights. In the absence of
legislative guidance, the issue is within their rightful authority
even though they attempt to resolve it with illogical and
unconstitutional reasoning.139 The courts, however, continue
to plead for legislative action on the issue of definitions.
Courts, comprised of at most nine individuals and relying
solely on briefs and sporadic, supplemental research, admit
that the legislature is better equipped to determine just what
constitutes withholdable or withdrawable life sustaining
treatment. 1 40
137. Both Colyer and Hamlin pertained to individuals in "irreversible comas" or"persistent vegetative states." The Grant court was not willing to wait until Barbara
Grant passed this threshold.
138. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1014, 1018, 1021, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 488, 491, 492-93 (1983); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass.
417, 447, 497 N.E.2d 626, 643 (1986) (Lynch, J., dissenting in part, calling for judicial
restraint); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 755 n.18, 370
N.E.2d 417, 432 n.18 (1977).
139. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text. The Quinlan court and those
which followed its reasoning failed to appreciate the stark difference between a
competent adult's decision and the decisions made by third parties for incompetent
individuals.
140. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491;
Superintendant of Public Schools v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 755 n.18, 370 N.E.2d at 432
n.18; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 370, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269, cert
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Grant is no different in this respect.'41 Justice Callow
stated, however, "that the fact remains... that the petitioners
have addressed the problem dealing with their daughter, her
rights and desires, and their circumstances to this court, not
the Legislature, and we must answer an immediate problem
now not an academic problem at some future date."'42 Accord-
ing to this reasoning, the court will answer any individual who
comes to court under the proper "circumstances" and with an
"immediate problem." Unfortunately, Justice Callow's rule
appears to apply even to problems involving difficult public
policy issues, such as Grant, where the court, unlike the legis-
lature, is inherently unable to accurately and comprehensively
weigh the impact of its answers. Justice Callow stated that
"the issue presented here [artificial nutrition and hydration as
life sustaining treatment] has only recently been addressed by
courts, commentators and the medical profession."' 43 In addi-
tion, Justice Callow never acknowledged that, even as he
wrote his opinion, the Washington State Legislature was also
embroiled in debate over whether to characterize artificial
nutrition and hydration as life sustaining treatment under the
NDA."' Despite the controversy which raged outside the halls
of the supreme court, 4 ' Justice Callow chose to characterize
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 821, 689 P.2d 1372, 1379
(1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 139, 660 P.2d 738, 752 (1983).
141. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 564, 747 P.2d at 455; see also id. at 573-74, 747
P.2d at 459-60 (Andersen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 576-79,
747 P.2d at 462-63 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 564, 747 P.2d at 455.
143. Id. at 559, 747 P.2d at 452 (emphasis added).
144. Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill (ESSB) 5401 was first introduced on
January 28, 1987, and after the Washington State House and Senate passed conflicting
versions, the bill finished the legislative session in Conference Committee. The
primary obstacle to agreement, not surprisingly, was artificial nutrition and hydration.
The Senate bill read: "Life-sustaining treatment shall not include the administration
of medication or the performance of any medical or surgical care or the provision of
nutrition and hydration for comfort care deemed necessary to alleviate pain." ESSB
5401 at 3, lines 9-12. The House bill made no such exception for artificial nutrition and
hydration. See ESSB 5401 - H. Comm. Amendment at 3, lines 9-12.
In addition to ESSB 5401, a bill was introduced in the House on February 3, 1988,
before Grant was mandated, which stated:
The legislature finds that food and water are necessary to life, and, therefore,
the withdrawal or withholding of food or water constitutes suicide or
euthanasia, except in the case when two physicians independently determine
that death is imminent . . . or the person is physically unable to tolerate the
provision of such food and water.
HB 1965 at 3, lines 11-18. The debate over artificial nutrition and hydration continues
in the current legislative session over nearly identical statutory language.
145. Justice Andersen's opinion highlighted commentators and members of the
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artificial nutrition and hydration as life sustaining treatment.Further, he effectively preempted the legislature from decid-
ing the appropriate care for patients such as Barbara Grant
because of that branch's propensity for "emotional considera-
tions based upon an ignorance of medical reality."' 46 In effect,
Justice Callow declared that, despite legislative enactments
like the NDA, the legislature was too sentimental and obtuse
to determine the status of artificial nutrition and hydration
with regard to incompetent patients. 147
One of Justice Callow's major rationales for this expres-
sion of judicial activism, in circumstances that cried out for
judicial restraint, was that other state courts had acted simi-
medical profession, who, despite Justice Callow's representations to the contrary, urge
prohibiting the withholding or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration.
Instead, those commentators plea for "much fuller debate and discussion than has yet
taken place." Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 571-72, 747 P.2d at 458-59 (Andersen, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part (quoting Siegler and Weisbard, Against the
Emerging Stream Should Fluids and Nutritional Support Be Discontinued? 145
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 129 (1985))).
Andersen also chronicled the current legislative debate, commenting on the "great
deal of statewide public attention . . .press reports .. .[and the] numerous individuals
and professional health care and hospice people" who testified before the legislature.
Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 573, 747 P.2d at 460 (fifteen physician, nurse, health care
provider, patient, research, senior citizen, and religious organizations are listed).
146. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 565, 747 P.2d at 455. While Justice Callow's opinion
did not preclude further action by the legislature on the issue of artificial nutrition and
hydration, it sought to establish the legal status of artificial nutrition and hydration in
Washington State: "We hold that the right of a terminally ill patient to have life
sustaining procedures withheld includes the right to withhold nasogastric tubes,
intravenous feeding, and other artificial means of nutrition and hydration." Id. This
concluding statement on the issue of artificial nutrition and hydration reads
remarkably like a legislative finding. Further, if binding, it unequivocally establishes
that artificial nutrition and hydration, not only in Barbara Grant's case but in all cases
of the terminally ill, are withholdable and withdrawable. While the legislature may
still address this issue, its inquiry will not be entirely free; the legislature may not
address the issue without either accepting or rejecting the Supreme Court's decision.
Indeed, Justices Andersen and Goodloe hinted that the legislature was most likely
preempted from addressing the issue of artificial nutrition and hydration. Justice
Andersen stated that "[tihe legislature had this identical issue under consideration at a
recent legislative session and would undoubtedly consider it again except, perhaps, for
the majority's holding in the present case." Id. at 570, 747 P.2d at 458 (emphasis
added). Further, Justice Goodloe stated that "with apparent ease, the majority cuts off
the debate and concludes that the right to withhold treatment extends to nutrition and
hydration." Id. at 579, 747 P.2d at 463 (italics added).
For the difficulties involved in a legislative rejection of Grant, see infra note 147.
147. It is unclear what the fate of future legislative enactments that are contrary
to Grant would be. Grant sought to recognize a constitutional right to have artificial
nutrition and hydration withheld. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 565, 747 P.2d at 455.
Therefore, a legislative enactment rejecting this newly created "right" might very well
be stricken on constitutional grounds by the justices of the Grant court's majority.
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larly.148 Arguably, the doctrine of "two wrongs make a right"
has never before been cited to support a decision with such
impact. 149
Justice Andersen's dissent attacked the majority for decid-
ing an issue rightfully within the domain of the legislature. He
stated that the judicial system had no better ability to under-
stand and decide the policy issues underlying Grant than the
electorate or the legislature.'- ° He then provided reasons why
the legislature is the proper forum for deciding this "very basic
public policy."''
Justice Andersen observed that the legislature had access
to the direct input of its constituents, many of whom person-
ally confront the issue of life sustaining treatment. 152 He also
recognized the legislature's ability to hold public hearings
where "everyone concerned, including professionals of all
types, can be heard and have their views given full
consideration." 1 53
Justice Andersen's observations about the advantages of
the legislature and their sharp contrast with the limitations of
the supreme court are well taken. The court deals only with
individual attorneys on specific cases in the isolation of its
courtroom and chambers. It can tap the knowledge of experts
only through the experts' writings which are sometimes dis-
covered in supplemental research.
The illogical leaps in reasoning throughout Justice Cal-
low's opinion demonstrate the strength and logic, of Justice
Andersen's dissenting opinion. Clearly, it is the role of the leg-
islature to formulate consistent public policy, especially when
such policy relates to the complex issue of what constitutes life
sustaining treatment. Justice Callow's opinion acknowledged
this as the proper role of the legislature. The opinion, how-
ever, went beyond the facts of Barbara Grant's case and sought
to create a universally applicable rule that artificial nutrition
and hydration are withholdable and withdrawable treatment.
148. Id at 564, 747 P.2d at 455.
149. The possible exception to this claim is the adoption by some courts of the
Quinlan court's reasoning, which created a right in third parties to exercise another
individual's rights of privacy and self determination. See supra notes 105-10 and
accompanying text.
150. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 574, 747 P.2d at 460 (Andersen, J., concurring in part






While Justice Andersen's arguments support legislative
resolution of the artificial nutrition and hydration issue, the
court itself demonstrated its institutional incompetence
throughout its disposition of Grant. First, the majority was
unaware of, or ignored, legislative action on the issue that was
taking place at the precise time the court was formulating its
opinion. If it had acknowledged the existence of ESSB 5401,1'
the majority may have been compelled to let the legislature
decide the issue. As Justice Goodloe wrote in dissent:
The failure of the Legislature to extend the NDA [to cover
withholding and withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion] demonstrates that, unlike the majority, the Legislature
is having a difficult time determining the extent of authority
which guardians ought to have in deciding matters of life
and death for their wards. 155
Further, as Justice Andersen stated:
The Legislature enacted the Natural Death Act and if, with
the benefit of all its resources, the Legislature can pass a law
allowing the withdrawal of food and water while protecting
the infirm and helpless, then well and good; if not, that too
should tell us something.1 56
Second, as evidenced by Assistant Attorney General
Milam's letter, the court issued an opinion without knowing
that the decision apparently contradicted the new informed-
consent legislation. 57 The court attempted to correct its mis-
take but contradicted its own previous order in the process. 5 '
The court finally mandated an opinion with no clear majority
and no clear indication of its position. 159
In assessing the Grant court's mistakes, it is important to
recall that the judiciary is isolated from the political process by
design.160 One consequence of this is that the judiciary is ill-
equipped to keep abreast of developments in other branches of
154. See supra note 144.
155. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 579, 747 P.2d at 463 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 574, 747 P.2d at 460 (Andersen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 56-63.
160. See State ex reL Govan v. Clausen, 108 Wash. 133, 183 P. 115 (1919). The court
stated:
[T]he motive or purpose of the legislature in adopting laws may not be
inquired into by the courts . .. [because to do so] "would put an end to that
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government. Thus, the court may very likely contradict the
legitimate conclusion of another branch of government when
considering a complex and controversial issue. While the judi-
ciary must at times infuse itself into such issues, 6' it must do
so only with the utmost caution and care. The Grant court's
attempt to terminate legislative debate and usurp legislative
decision making power is the antithesis of caution and care.
III. ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION ARE NOT
WITHHOLDABLE AND WITHDRAWABLE LIFE
SUSTAINING TREATMENT
In re Grant left the issue of artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion entirely unresolved. Therefore, it is up to the court or leg-
islature to clear up the court's "very muddy" conclusion, and to
determine whether artificial nutrition and hydration are in
fact life sustaining treatment. Whichever branch finally
decides the issue, it must examine the following arguments,
and it should ultimately decide not to classify artificial nutri-
tion and hydration as life sustaining treatment.
A. The Constitutional Argument
In addition to being attacked for illogical reasoning and
exceeding the boundaries of judicial responsibility, Quinlan
and the cases which rely on it have been attacked on constitu-
tional grounds.'6 2 Attorney and author James Bopp 163 has crit-
icized these decisions as inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause"6  as well as substantive 16  and procedural due
confidence and respect... [the separate branches of government have for one
another] which it is the purpose of the Constitution to uphold....
Id. at 142, 183 P. at 118 (quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 55 (1903)).
161. Perhaps the most obvious such case is Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
495-6 (1954). The Supreme Court later coordinated federal district courts to uniformly
implement its non-discrimination policy and overcome recalcitrant local authorities on
the issue of school desegregation. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
162. See Smith, In re Quinlan: Defining the Basis for Terminating Life Support
Under the Right of Privacy, 12 TULSA L.J. 150 (1976); Note, Constitutional Law-No
Constitutional Basis Exists to Permit a Parent to Assert for His Adult Child a Right to
Die, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 716 (1976).
163. President, National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and Disabled,
Inc.; General Counsel, National Right to Life Committee, Inc.; Member, Congressional
Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee; Former Member, President's Committee on
Mental Retardation; Editor, ISSUES IN LAW AND MEDICINE; J.D. University of Florida,
1973. See J. Bopp, 4 ISSUES IN LAW AND MEDICINE 3 (1988).
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Quinlan and its progeny mandate unequal
treatment of the class of incompetent individuals. Incompetent individuals are a
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suspect class because they possess the immutable disability of incompetency, they are
precluded from participation in the political process, and they "can claim some degree
of prejudice from at least part of the public at large." Bopp, supra note 163, at 17
(quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985)).
They are treated differently from competent individuals solely because of their
incompetency. The consent of a competent adult is required before one can withdraw
life sustaining treatment from him or her, yet a third party may withdraw such
treatment from an incompetent individual without that individual's consent. Such
disparate treatment between two classes of individuals constitutes a clear violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.
State court decisions and legislation allowing the removal of artificial nutrition
and hydration from incompetent individuals create specific constitutional violations of
their own. By retaining criminal sanctions only for those who remove food and water
from non-consenting, competent patients, these states do not equally protect the lives
of non-consenting, incompetent patients. Id. at 19. In these states, one who withdraws
artificial nutrition and hydration from a competent patient who has not consented to
the withdrawal may be charged with murder. On the other hand, one acting under a
best interests or substituted judgment standard who withdraws artificial nutrition and
hydration from a patient who would not consent to the withdrawal, but is incompetent
to do so, will not be held criminally liable. This kind of blatantly unequal treatment is
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 21.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Withholding or withdrawing food and water
from incompetent individuals has also been treated as a violation of substantive due
process. Bopp, supra note 163 at 21-23. All persons have a fundamental right to life.
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The removal of food and water,
and thus life, from incompetent individuals who have not consented, absent a
compelling state interest, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), deprives these
individuals of substantive due process.
Further, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment granted involuntarily committed, mentally
retarded individuals "a right to adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care."
Similarly, in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) the Court found that the state must
provide for the medical needs of prisoners because of their total dependence on the
state. Incompetent individuals are totally dependent on the hospital staff and
physician, who are regulated by the state. This regulation is sufficient to classify the
provision and denial of artificial nutrition and hydration as state action. Therefore,
when this treatment is denied without the patient's consent, the state violates this
patient's substantive due process right to life. Bopp, supra note 163, at 12-15, 22.
166. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Decisions such as Grant violate procedural due
process as well because they do not provide appropriate procedures before the right to
life is extinguished. Bopp, supra note 163, at 24-30. Family members with conflicting
interests and unfamiliar attending physicians not chosen by the incompetent individual
may not make decisions reflecting that individual's true intent. Likewise, parties
motivated to end some perceived emotional and economic burden on the patient, or
the real emotional and economic burden on themselves, will not necessarily make
decisions in the best interests of the patient. Id. at 24.
Most importantly, however, there is the "distorting effect of negative attitudes
concerning people with disabilities." Id. at 25. Society devalues the lives of retarded or
incapacitated individuals and therefore deems these lives to be incapable of enjoyment
or void of sufficient worth. This attitude precludes a finding that it is in an
incompetent individual's best interest to continue receiving food and water. For these
reasons, contrary to the finding in Grant, the decisions of relatives, guardians, and
physicians must be reviewed by an objective and disinterested court. Conflicting
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B. The "Emotional" Argument
Many authorities distinguish artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion as basic, required care rather than life sustaining treat-
ment. Some authors and judges 67 belittle this view by
claiming that these authorities are acting solely on their emo-
tions. These authors and judges maintain that the cultural
identity of food and water with comfort and nurturing pre-
vents most people from shaking the mistaken belief that artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration are food and water. This mistaken
belief, these judges conclude, precludes emotionally oriented
people from agreeing that artificial nutrition and hydration are
withholdable and withdrawable.' 68 The fallacy that artificial
nutrition and hydration are fundamentally different from
other types of food and water will be addressed in the next sec-
tion. First, however, an argument may be made against the
Grant court's conclusions based upon fundamental human
emotions.
Ethicist Daniel Callahan 169 writes that feelings and senti-
ment are synonymous with a well ordered moral life. "If they
[emotions] are not always reliable guides, their absence is even
more hazardous, as anyone who has dealt with a sociopath is
painfully aware."' 7 °
Callahan explains that "withholding and withdrawing arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration is fast becoming the 'nontreat-
ment of choice' because it is the only way to insure that
interests and negative attitudes of loving family members are not the norm in these
situations. Nevertheless, the possibility of such interests and attitudes cannot be
ignored, and the right to procedural due process must be enforced to protect
incompetent individuals from wrongly-motivated decisions. See supra note 119; see
also In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 534, 531 N.E.2d 607, N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988) (New York
requires such a system of review).
Finally, incompetent individuals have a fundamental right to be provided with
food and water. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Supreme Court accorded
the right to welfare benefits, which provide daily sustenance, the strictest procedural
protection. Therefore, like the institutionalized incompetent in Youngberg, supra note
165, the prisoner in Estelle, supra note 165, and the welfare recipient in Goldberg,
Barbara Grant's private interest in receiving nutrition and hydration is a fundamental
right. Like these individuals, Barbara depends on nutrition and hydration to sustain
her life, and she is dependent upon others to furnish it. Bopp, supra at 27.
167. See supra text accompanying note 146; How Should Washington Decide,
supra note 5.
168. See How Should Washington Decide, supra note 5.
169. Director, the Hastings Center, a medical ethics research center.




'tenacious patients actually die.' "171 He then characterizes as
purely rational and "legitimate" a policy decision that, if food
and water cannot return a patient to a "cognitive" life, it
should then be withdrawn. 172 Nevertheless, Callahan recog-
nizes that "a cluster of sentiments and emotions" blocks the
institution of this kind of policy.'73 These sentiments and emo-
tions require that we not starve someone who is incapable of
feeding him or herself. The desire to feed the hungry is
greater than pure utility and rationality because "[i]t is the
perfect symbol that human life is inescapably social and
communal."174
Callahan, therefore, sees nothing wrong with being
repulsed by the withholding or withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration from an individual in need. Even if an anti-starva-
tion policy may not be fully defended on rational grounds, Cal-
lahan maintains it could preserve "one of the few moral
emotions that could just as easily be called a necessary social
instinct.' 17' Despite the Grant court's condescending approach
to "emotional considerations," Callahan's purely emotional
opposition to the withholding and withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration poses a strong argument against the
Grant court's conclusions.
Another argument against withholding or withdrawing
artificial nutrition and hydration, characterized both as emo-
tional 76 and as a state interest, 177 is that forcing doctors to
withhold or withdraw erodes the essential physician-patient
relationship.7 7 A doctor, because of his or her superior knowl-
edge, owes a fiduciary duty to the patient. This includes the
duty to provide medical care and necessities such as food and
shelter and to act to preserve the life of the patient. There-
171. Id. Karen Quinlan, for example, survived ten years after her respirator was
withdrawn. Malcolm, The End of the Quinlan Case But Not the Issues It Raised, N.Y.





176. Provision of food and water by physicians is belittled in the same way as any
"comfort and care" argument. Some commentators state that the inherent human
belief that food and water offer comfort to those without such nutrition and hydration
clouds rational judgment. Some patients, they maintain, are better off starving,
regardless of whether they can tolerate food and water any longer. See How Should
Washington Decide, supra note 5, at 446-47.
177. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 556, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (1987).
178. See Bopp, supra note 163, at 15-16, 44.
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fore, if physicians are forced to refuse nutrition and hydration
for their patients, they are forced to violate their fiduciary
duty. "The presumption that the physician will act to preserve
his patient's life and health will erode and the physician-
patient relationship will be damaged.' '1 79
The Grant court, quoting Colyer, dismissed this concern by
stating that doctors must sometimes provide only comfort
instead of treatment and that "it is not necessary to deny a
right of self-determination to a patient in order to recognize
the interests of doctors.' 1 80 However, this claim is legitimate
only if the patient has truly exercised his or her right of self-
determination, and, as shown above,181 third party decision
making does not always accomplish this end. As a result, doc-
tors may be forced to withhold basic sustenance from a patient
who may be vehemently opposed to such action.
Furthermore, Grant cited an American Medical Associa-
tion statement 182 and the report of a Presidential Commis-
sion 83 to support the proposition that "[1life prolonging
medical treatment includes medication and artificially or tech-
nologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration."' 84
Despite the resulting inference that the medical profession
approves the withholding and withdrawal of artificial nutrition
and hydration from terminally ill patients, "many physicians
believe discontinuance of hydration would irrevocably sever
the therapeutic relationship, while maintaining hydration
would reinforce traditional goals of the physician-patient rela-
tionship: to cure sometimes, to relieve occasionally, to comfort
always.' ' 85 Thus, many physicians legitimately believe that
artificial nutrition and hydration are not life sustaining treat-
ment. This belief rests not only on "emotional" grounds,
which alone may be sufficient, but upon logical grounds as
well.
179. Id. at 16.
180. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 557, 747 P.2d at 451 (citations omitted).
181. See supra note 36.
182. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 562, 747 P.2d at 454.
183. Id., citing How Should Washington Decide, supra note 5, at 3, 90, 288.
184. Id., (quoting Statement by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
(Mar. 15, 1986)).
185. Seigler and Weisbard, Against the Emerging Stream: Should Fluids and




C The Logical Argument
Grant's contention that artificial nutrition and hydration
constitute life sustaining treatment is further weakened when
one realizes that food and water are clearly distinguishable
from other care given dying patients.
Grant determined that nasogastric tubes and intraveneous
infusions are not "typical" ways of receiving nutrition. The
court found that artificial nutrition and hydration may be
withheld or withdrawn from incompetent individuals when
third parties so order because: (1) artificial nutrition and
hydration are different from "typical" ways of providing nutri-
tion;" 6 (2) they involve invasive procedures;.. 7 (3) they are
similar to life sustaining treatments, such as respirators; 8 (4)
they are not completely without risk; 8 9 (5) their removal may
be more comfortable to the patient than their provision; 9 0 and
(6) some doctors feel it is life sustaining treatment."' The
Grant court's sixth premise was discussed above; spirited
debate continues in the medical profession over whether to
classify artificial nutrition and hydration as refusable treat-
ment. 9 2 The weaknesses of each of the five remaining prem-
ises are addressed below.
First, Grant failed to adequately define "typical." Some
retarded adults and quadraplegic persons, most small children,
and all infants "typically" depend upon the assistance of others
to provide them with food and fluids. This assistance ranges
from oral feeding by bottle and spoon to tube feeding directly
into a major artery. 9 3 In cases such as Barbara Grant's, a fluid
nearly identical to infant formula is introduced into the stom-
ach or digestive tract through nasogastric or g-tubes. In all
instances of enteral feeding, the concept is the same: a vehicle
other than one's hands and one's throat muscles is used to feed
one who cannot feed him or herself. Nevertheless, the court
chose to distinguish between nasogastric or g-tubes as
withholdable and withdrawable, and, apparently, spoon and
bottle feeding of swallowing humans as not.




190. Id. at 561, 747 P.2d at 453.
191. Id. at 562, 747 P.2d at 454.
192. See supra text accompanying note 185.
193. See supra note 4.
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In this respect, the Grant court used the same flawed anal-
ysis of artificial nutrition and hydration used by prior courts; it
looked to form instead of substance. Because nasogastric and
g-tubes are inserted into an individual's body, the court
claimed, they are invasive and therefore withdrawable. 94 Not
only is this analysis flawed, it is inconsistent: the invasive pro-
cedure of inserting a spoon or bottle into an individual's mouth
is not likewise deemed withholdable or withdrawable. Provid-
ing nutrition to a patient through a plastic tube is inherently
no different than providing nutrition through a plastic spoon
or bottle. As Massachusetts Justice Nolan stated in dissent in
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital:
... the court has built its entire case on an outrageously
erroneous premise, i.e., food and liquids are medical treat-
ment. The issue is not whether the tube should be inserted
but whether food should be given through the tube. The
process of feeding is simply not medical treatment.... Food
and water are basic human needs.' 95
Nutrition and hydration, whether provided in typical or atypi-
cal fashion, satisfy basic human needs; they are not withdraw-
able medical treatment.
The Grant court's third rationale for characterizing artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration as life sustaining treatment is that
it is similar to a respirator, a mode of treatment already
deemed withholdable or withdrawable. Both a respirator and
artificial nutrition and hydration involve intubation, but that is
where the similarity ends.
A respirator does more than supply oxygen like an oxygen
mask or tent; it supplants the normally spontaneous, bodily
functions of respiration. Proof of this proposition is found in
cases where otherwise helpless patients, removed from the
assistance of a respirator, resume breathing on their own. 196 In
contrast, feeding through nasogastric and g-tubes serves the
sole purpose of providing a basic resource; it does not supplant
a spontaneous bodily function. Therefore, unlike those
patients who have been removed from respirators and continue
to breathe on their own, no otherwise helpless patient who has
been removed from artificial nutrition and hydration has ever
194. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 560, 747 P.2d at 453.
195. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 442, 497 N.E.2d 626,
640 (1986) (Nolan, J., dissenting).
196. See sources cited supra note 171.
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spontaneously become nourished or hydrated on his or her
own. Clearly, denial of artificial nutrition and hydration more
closely resembles suffocation, the denial of oxygen, than
removal of a respirator.197
The Washington court failed to grasp this difference as
well as the similarity of artificial nutrition and hydration to a
treatment the courts have allowed only competent adults to
refuse: blood transfusions.19 In In re Storar,'99 a guardian
requested termination of blood transfusions for her severely
retarded adult son. The son was losing blood because of a ter-
minal case of bladder cancer. Death by loss of blood and death
by cancer were the son's only two options. The court ruled
that the transfusions must continue because "[they] were
analogous to food-they would not cure the cancer, but they
could eliminate the risk of death from another treatable
cause."200
Similarly, artificial nutrition and hydration do not treat an
underlying disease; they eliminate the risk of death by starva-
tion. The Grant court's failure to grasp the analogy between
blood transfusions and artificial nutrition and hydration
reflects either an ignorance of medical reality, a failure to con-
sider reasoning which challenges the court's conclusion, or
both.
The Grant court also relied on evidence that nasogastric
and g-tubes "are not without risks."'20 1 In doing so, the court
merely stated a truism: no medical care, life sustaining or not,
197. Like Grant, a recent U.S. District Court opinion did not distinguish between a
respirator and artificial nutrition and hydration. The court stated that "there is no
legal difference between a mechanical device that allows a person to breathe
artificially and a mechanical device that artificially allows a person nourishment."
Gray by Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587 (D.R.I. 1988). The court's statement,
however, demonstrated the difficulty of equating a respirator and artificial nutrition
and hydration. A respirator allows one "to breathe"; the verb "to breathe" reflects the
respirator's function of taking over one's repiratory system. Artificial nutrition and
hydration provide "nourishment"; the noun "nourishment" reflects the purpose of
artificial nutrition and hydration not to supplant one's digestive system but to provide
the basic element with which that system works (enteral feeding) or bypass the system
completely (parenteral feeding). The inherent difference between a respirator and
artificial nutrition and hydration prohibits even a grammatical similarity from being
drawn.
198. See In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
199. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
200. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 381, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 275, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1982) (emphasis added).
201. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 560, 747 P.2d at 453.
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is without risks. The risks of intubation are well-docu-
mented, °2 yet it is just as widely accepted that, once the tube
is placed through a relatively simple procedure, complications
are rare.20 3
Perhaps the Grant court's weakest rationale is that dehy-
dration and malnourishment may not be "distressful" to a ter-
minally ill patient. °4 One need only ask what impact the
withholding and withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion have on one's body to determine the degree of "distress"
experienced. Justice Lynch, another dissenter in Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hospital,"5 asserted that such withholding
is "particularly difficult, painful and gruesome ' '2°6 and summa-
rized the impact of withdrawing food and water as follows:
Brophy's mouth would dry out and become caked or coated
with thick material. His lips would become parched and
cracked. His tongue would swell, and might crack. His eyes
would recede back into their orbits and his cheeks would
become hollow. The lining of his nose might crack and cause
his nose to bleed. His skin would hang loose on his body and
become dry and scaly. His urine would become highly con-
centrated, leading to burning of the bladder. The lining of
his stomach would dry out and he would experience dry
heaves and vomiting. His body temperature would become
very high. His brain cells would dry out, causing convul-
sions. His respiratory tract would dry out, and the thick
secretions that would result could plug his lungs and cause
death. At some point, within five days to three weeks his
major organs, including his lungs, heart, and brain, would
give out and he would die. The [trial] judge found that death
by dehydration is extremely painful and uncomfortable for a
human being. The [trial] judge could not rule out the possi-
bility that Paul Brophy would experience pain in such a sce-
nario. Paul Brophy's attending physician described death by
dehydration as cruel and violent.20 7
202. See How Should Washington Decide, supra note 5.
203. See LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 2, at 280-86.
204. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 561, 747 P.2d at 453. The court concedes that
"'clinicians and researchers are just beginning to explore the complex effects
nourishment and even hydration can have on terminally ill patients.'" Id., (quoting
Dresser and Boisaubin, Ethics, Law, and Nutritional Support, 145 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MED. 122, 124 (1985) (emphasis added)).
205. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (Lynch, J., dissenting in part).
206. Id. at 444, 447 N.E.2d at 641.
207. Id. at 444 n.2, 497 N.E.2d at 641 n.2.
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In spite of such descriptions, the argument is made that
the patient from whom artificial nutrition and hydration is
withdrawn can feel no pain and is not aware of his environ-
ment; death is not an ordeal at all.2 °0 If this argument is valid,
the purpose of terminating treatment, to lessen the pain and
preserve the dignity of the incompetent individual, loses all
force. If no additional pain can be inflicted on the presumably
unresponsive patient, and his or her dignity is not compro-
mised by the long, degenerative process of starvation, waiting
for death brought about by an underlying condition, rather
than starvation, will not impose additional pain on the patient
or compromise his or her dignity. On the other hand, if death
by starvation proceeds as Paul Brophy's attending physician
believed, such a painful affront to one's dignity should not be
allowed.
A final "logical" argument against the characterization of
nutrition and hydration as refusable treatment concerns the
state interests in preserving life and preventing suicide. The
Grant court dismissed these interests in less than a paragraph,
citing Colyer for the proposition that a death occurring after
removal of life sustaining treatment results from natural
causes.20 9 However, because death after removal of artificial
nutrition and hydration is not caused by an underlying termi-
nal condition, but is rather caused by starvation and dehydra-
tion, artificial nutrition and hydration cannot be characterized
as a withdrawable life sustaining system. Colyer's proposition
that death following withholding or withdrawal of nutrition
and hydration is the result of natural causes is false, and the
state interests of preventing homicide and suicide must be
more deeply considered.
The right to self-determination, a primary rationale of Jus-
tice Callow's opinion, foresees individuals who intend to sus-
pend their medical treatment so that natural forces can take
their course. This right, however, does not allow others to
make this decision for patients undergoing medical treatment
nor is it a validation of a patient's intent to die. If nutrition
and hydration are withdrawn from an individual who has not
specifically consented to withdrawal and with the intent that
death occurs, such withdrawal should be considered homi-
208. See How Should Washington Decide, supra note 5.
209. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 556, 747 P.2d at 451 (citing Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123,
660 P.2d at 743).
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cide.21° Further, the court in Matter of Conroy2'1 correctly
observed that, in distinguishing between death by suicide and
death by natural causes, "the difference is between self-inflic-
tion or self-destruction and self-determination. ' 212  When an
individual refuses artificial nutrition and hydration, refusal is
often accompanied by an express suicidal intent.2 3 Regardless
of expressed intent, if nutrition and hydration are withdrawn
from a consenting individual who intends to die as a result, it
should be considered suicide.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court failed in its first attempt
to determine what right incompetent individuals have to artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration. Grant built upon the flawed rea-
soning of previous decisions that allowed third parties, while
professing to exercise an incompetent's exclusive, personal
rights to self-determination and privacy, to withhold or with-
draw life sustaining treatment from those individuals. Grant
not only upheld this faulty reasoning but further prejudiced
incompetent individuals' rights to self determination, privacy,
and life by classifying artificial nutrition and hydration as
withholdable and withdrawable life sustaining treatment.
The Grant decision has not ended the debate over this cru-
cial medical, social, and moral issue; Barbara Grant remains
alive, attorneys and physicians across the state are confused,
and the legislature continues to discuss the issue. Clearly, in
light of the Grant court's failure and the inherent weaknesses
of the judiciary, the legislature is the proper branch to decide
where Washington stands. Whichever branch eventually
decides, however, must consider constitutional, emotional, and
210. Bopp, supra note 163, at 48.
211. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
212. Id. at 351, 486 A.2d at 1224.
213. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (1986). In
a well-known case, Elizabeth Bouvia, a competent young woman with a long life
expectancy, was afflicted with severe cerebral palsy. She first refused intubation while
expressing a suicidal intent. The court denied her petition because allowing the
refusal would implicate the attending physicians and hospital staff in her suicide.
Bouvia reapplied, stating she wanted only to refuse medical treatment with no
intention of suicide. Because California had classified nutrition and hydration as
withholdable and withdrawable life sustaining treatment, see Barber v. Superior
Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006 (1983), the court had no choice but to
grant her petition. Although Bouvia attempted to starve herself to death after being
discharged, she later gave up the attempt.
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logical reasons which all refute the Grant court's majority
decision. Artificial nutrition and hydration are not life sus-
taining treatment and should not be legally withholdable or
withdrawable from incompetent individuals.
Stephen P. VanDerhoef
